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Abstract
Here we present a novel analysis of the geographic evolution of international banking
since 1980, which addresses still unanswered questions about the role of offshore
centers in the global financial crisis, and the post-crisis stability of these centers. We
show that post-1980 regulatory shifts prompted a ‘Great Inversion’ of offshore bank-
ing, wherein conventional Euromarket activity was partially overshadowed by the
growth of European ‘midshore’ center national banks. As a result, offshore jurisdic-
tions (i) were likely more responsible for pre-crisis regulatory failures in a home than
host regulator capacity and (ii) internalized far greater domestic fiscal risks than in
previous crises.
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1. Introduction
Offshore financial centers are typically discussed in relation to their negative impacts on
other economies. These include depriving states of tax revenues, enabling illicit financial
activities and corruption, undermining global financial regulation and stability, and insti-
gating a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ that grinds down international standards in all of these areas
(Palan et al., 2010; Shaxson, 2011). Recently, however, work on the so-called ‘finance
curse’ has focused attention on the negative impacts of international finance-led develop-
ment on offshore states themselves—keeping in mind that the most important of these
have never been tropical ‘small islands’, but rather European countries such as the UK,
Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland or Cyprus, or in some contexts US
states such as Delaware (Shaxson and Christensen, 2013; Christensen et al. 2016). As
highlighted by the global financial and Eurozone crises, the most terrifying scenario faced
by these states is the prospect of finding themselves fiscally liable for some portion of the
vast financial ‘casino’ intermediated through their borders (Shaxson and Christensen,
2013). In cases such as Ireland and Cyprus, the economic and social consequences of this
have been disastrous (Donovan and Murphy, 2013; Michaelides, 2014). Meanwhile,
Iceland has only avoided similar consequences by repudiating its banks’ debts and
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disconnecting itself from the global financial system (Baldursson and Portes, 2014). Even
in the UK, the state’s exposure to failing financial institutions prompted less-than-
outlandish crisis concerns of a ‘Reykjavik-on-Thames’ (The Economist, 2009).
There is a voluminous body of case study work examining the national historical path-
ways—particularly of political and economic capture—that led to disaster in specific off-
shore banking centers (e.g. Aliber and Zoega, 2011; Connor et al. 2012; Donovan and
Murphy, 2013; Baldursson and Portes, 2014; Michaelides, 2014; Christensen et al. 2016).
However, the growing tendency for offshore jurisdictions to become part of the collateral
damage from their own activities also raises puzzling questions about the multi-decadal
evolution of offshore banking from a broader global structural standpoint. Offshore centers
have been a prominent feature of global finance for more than half a century, during
which time they have frequently played a role in generating financial and debt crises
whose effects are felt elsewhere—most notably the Euromarket-centered early 1980s Less-
Developed Country (LDC) debt crisis (Strange, 1994), which left decades of economic
devastation in its wake for much of the developing world. However, it is only recently
that they have begun to violently self-destruct. The key question is what underlying global
processes—if any—have led to this change? Have these countries simply been swept up
in some overarching tendency toward ‘financialization’ (Epstein, 2005; O Riain, 2012;
Raza et al., 2016), both onshore and offshore, that has raised the stakes of hosting finan-
cial activities in general, or are they victims of some more specific shift in the architecture
of global finance?
The remainder of this article is divided into four sections, which provide a novel ac-
count of the global structural evolution of offshore banking from the 1980s to the global
financial crisis—contributing to an expanding body of work on the offshore legal–political
geography of finance (Roberts, 1994; Hudson, 2000; Warf, 2000; Bassens et al. 2013;
Wójcik, 2013a; Coe et al. 2014; Dörry, 2014; Cobham et al. 2015; Haberly and I Wójcik,
2015, 2017; Hall, 2018). As we demonstrate, Ireland, Iceland and Cyprus were the most
acute casualties of a global structural shift in offshore banking that occurred between the
early-1980s and early-2000s. As shown in Section 2, prior to this structural shift, the
growth of offshore banking centers had been primarily driven by the local deposit taking
and lending activities of foreign banks in the Euromarket. As these banks were back-
stopped by their home states ‘onshore’, this system posed little risk to offshore host states.
From the 1980s, however, widespread onshore deregulation undermined the relative regu-
latory advantages of the Euromarket. Meanwhile, the growing importance of home-state
consolidated capital supervision encouraged the rise of ‘shadow banking’-based strategies
of bank regulatory arbitrage—wherein the regulatory significance of on/off-balance sheet
increasingly superseded onshore/offshore in the traditional sense. Together, these changes
produced a 2-fold shift in the geographic logic of offshore banking. On the one hand,
‘small islands’ (e.g. the Cayman Islands) increasingly shifted from hosting the deposit-
taking and lending activities of foreign banks, to the off-balance sheet securitization
vehicles of these banks. On the other hand, the fact that the regulatory arbitrage potential
of these vehicles was primarily conditioned by the home state capital treatment of their
sponsor banks, fostered the growth of a new axis of nationality-based international regula-
tory arbitrage. This entailed the use of international mergers and acquisitions—in a logic
both paralleling and intersecting with that of corporate tax ‘inversions’—to shift assets to
the ownership of banks headquartered in states with relatively permissive capital regulators
(and typically also lower corporate tax rates).
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As we show in Section 3, this shift in assets to lightly taxed and regulated jurisdictions
at the home state level—which we dub the ‘Great Inversion’—disproportionately encour-
aged the growth of the national banks of European ‘midshore’ banking centers such as the
UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Iceland. All told, the growth of
these countries’ banks involved, in market share terms, the geographic reallocation of
roughly a quarter of total worldwide cross-border banking assets, on a home nationality
basis, from the late 1980s to 2007 (and an even larger percentage of assets at the level of
the world’s largest banks). Furthermore, European offshore national bank growth was dis-
proportionately driven by entry into the riskiest ‘shadow banking’ activities implicated in
the global financial crisis, wherein the total pre-crisis market share of these banks (most
importantly British, Swiss, Dutch and Belgian) was only slightly less than the American
banks that had invented these instruments. By the eve of the global financial crisis, the
old offshore misalignment between bank nationality and bank territory of operation had
been largely superseded by a new misalignment between the size of multinational banking
groups, and the size of their home states’ economies—and in conjunction with this, be-
tween bank liability currency denomination, and home state central bank lender of last re-
sort capacity. As we show in Section 4, this was inherently unstable in the event of a
major financial shock, as the responsibility for backstopping the riskiest components of
the international banking system was now disproportionately concentrated on small
European states with a limited capability to fulfill this responsibility. In the wake of the
global financial crisis, the major European offshore centers were thus forced to restore
their national banks to heath primarily by downsizing them, while trying (with varying
levels of success) to minimize national fiscal, financial and economic disruption. The
‘Great Inversion’ thus rapidly unwound.
We conclude in Section 5 by suggesting that offshore banking centers may face a ‘polit-
ical-geographic paradox’ that renders their development inherently unsustainable under ei-
ther host or home-based regulation. Ironically, the only model of offshore that appears to
navigate this paradox is a state capitalist one (e.g. as seen in Singapore or Hong Kong),
which is stabilized by a combination of offshore state foreign currency reserve hoarding,
and the direct participation of foreign state-owned financial institutions whose offshore
activities are actively encouraged and sanctioned by their home state.
2. The 1980s international banking regulatory reconfiguration and the
decline of the offshore Euromarket
The concepts of ‘offshore’ finance, and offshore financial center or jurisdiction, are notori-
ously resistant to neat definition. Particularly, challenging is the fact that analyses of ‘off-
shore’ problems such as corporate profit shifting, financial regulatory arbitrage or financial
secrecy typically show that these are dominated by what can be described as large ‘mid-
shore’ or ‘onshore-offshore’ jurisdictions, as opposed to the ‘small islands’ stereotypically
associated with offshore. Well-known examples include the central role of Ireland, the
Netherlands and (formerly) Belgium in corporate profit shifting, of Switzerland and par-
ticular US states in financial secrecy, and of London/the UK in the offshore Euromarket
(Palan et al., 2010; Shaxson, 2011; Coe et al. 2014; Cobham et al. 2015). Further compli-
cating matters definitionally is the fact that the logic of ‘offshore’ tax and regulatory arbi-
trage is a network-relational one that emerges through the interaction of laws in multiple
‘offshore’ and ‘onshore’ jurisdictions (Wójcik, 2013a; Coe et al., 2014; Dörry, 2014;






/joeg/article/20/6/1263/6017416 by guest on 12 January 2021
Seabrooke and Wigan, 2014; Haberly and Wojcik, 2015). For example, a country that
serves as a tax haven from the standpoint of American multinational firms—e.g. the UK
or Canada prior to the 2017 US tax reform—might not be considered such from stand-
point of other countries.
With this ambiguity in mind, the understanding of offshore employed here is a substan-
tive one that focuses on the presence of geographic ‘misalignments’ in international fi-
nance that are attributable to international tax and regulatory arbitrage. There are two
basic geometries that these misalignments can take. The first, and most common geometry,
is that of territorial misalignment according to a logic of host-based arbitrage—i.e. off-
shore jurisdictions attracting activities on a nominal territorial (booking basis) by offering
local tax and regulatory advantages to foreigners. However, in many contexts, one also
finds an ‘inverted’ offshore geometry of nationality-based misalignment, shaped by home-
based jurisdictional arbitrage—i.e. the granting of tax and regulatory advantage to firms
that are locally headquartered or incorporated at the parent company level.1
The practical distinction between the ‘classic’ territorial and the ‘inverted’ nationality-
based geometries of offshore misalignment is sometimes ambiguous—for example, in the
context of many US corporate tax inversions that involve a shift in parent company in-
corporation jurisdiction, but not in operational headquarters (Marian, 2015). However,
which offshore geometry is employed sometimes has important ramifications for firm
treatment or behavior—most importantly insofar as the nationality of firms impacts their
relationships with states as providers of sovereign ‘protection’, as broadly defined (see
Tilly, 1985). Notably, this issue has reared its head even in cases where there would seem
to be little question about a firm’s substantive, as opposed to formal legal nationality. US-
headquartered Broadcom, for example, which had inverted to Singaporean domiciliation in
2015, was in 2018 forced to return to US domiciliation to avoid being subjected to
CFIUS scrutiny as a ‘foreign’ acquirer of American technology firms (Swamynathan,
2018). Similarly, the fact that most Chinese information technology firms are organized
via ‘inverted’ corporate holding structures—wherein the parent company is incorporated in
the Caribbean (e.g. Cayman Islands)—forces most to use legally questionable variable
interest entity structures to control their own subsidiaries in strategically sensitive sectors
where ‘foreign’ ownership is banned (The Economist, 2017).
Ultimately, it is in finance that the relationship between firm nationality and sovereign
‘protection’ is perhaps most critical. This is particularly true for banking, which is argu-
ably more dependent on state backing than any other sector (Ferri and Minsky, 1992). The
responsibility for backstopping international banks is, in general, assigned to various states
more through messy de facto practice than formal statute or agreement. However, it is typ-
ically the bank home state—i.e. the state where an international banking group is head-
quartered—that bears de facto responsibility for ‘bailing out’ banks with fundamental
solvency problems. Meanwhile, responsibility for short-term liquidity support is typically
assigned to various central banks according to a combination of host territorial and cur-
rency denomination basis (Herring, 2007). Sovereign liabilities potentially rest with many
states in this arrangement. However, the typical assumption is that the risks borne by
1 In essence, the distinction between the ‘territorial’ and ‘inverted’ modes of offshore misalignment here can be
framed by extending the Dunning OLI framework to tax and regulatory arbitrage, with ‘inverted’ and ‘territorial’
misalignments, respectively, driven by ‘ownership’ (i.e. parent company level) and ‘location’ (i.e. host
jurisdiction)-based tax and regulatory advantage. ‘Inverted/inversion’ here encompasses, but is somewhat
broader than, reference to classic corporate offshore ‘tax inversions’.
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central bank providers of liquidity support are underwritten, in the final analysis, by the
home states standing behind bank solvency.
This de facto allocation of bank solvency backstopping responsibility poses potentially
enormous fiscal risks for any small state home to disproportionately large international
banks. Until the 1990s, however, this problem was mostly hypothetical, as, apart from, in
Switzerland, local banks were not usually the key players in offshore banking. Crucially,
moreover, Swiss banks mostly attracted clients by providing secrecy for (prudentially)
low-risk wealth management activities, rather than by leveraging regulatory advantages—
thus limiting the risks they posed to Swiss taxpayers.2
Meanwhile, the principal locus of offshore banking regulatory arbitrage was, until the
1980s, the Euromarket. This allowed banks to free themselves from regulations in their
own home countries (primarily reserve requirements, interest rate caps and capital con-
trols) by operating or booking activities offshore in a host-based territorial sense
(Hampton, 1996). From the standpoint of offshore host states themselves, a critical attrac-
tion of this arrangement was the potential that it afforded to ‘ring fence’ the unregulated
offshore sector—and the financial and fiscal risks that it generated—from the domestic fi-
nancial system. Indeed, this logic of ring-fencing was at the heart of the prototypical
Euromarket developed by the UK. Shaxson (2011, 97) describes it:
A bizarre Alice in Wonderland logic lay behind the Bank of England’s decision not to regulate
these markets. . .If there was a run on a regulated bank in London, the Bank of England, by virtue
of being its regulator, would feel some obligation to come in and pick up the pieces. . .Better
then, the logic went, not to regulate them.
This ‘Alice in Wonderland logic’ only worked if there were secure and credible barriers
protecting the British economy (and taxpayers) from the potential liabilities associated
with hosting the Euromarket. This entailed constructing two interconnected lines of de-
fense. The first was currency denomination, with the Euromarket being limited to foreign
currency activities, for which foreign central banks, rather than the Bank of England,
would tend to act as lenders of last resort. Meanwhile, the second was bank nationality,
with the major British clearing (i.e. commercial) banks—which the Bank of England (and
potentially British taxpayers) would inevitably need to backstop in a crisis—being sub-
jected to reserve requirements and interest rate caps from which foreign banks were ex-
empt. British merchant (investment) banks were more lightly but not wholly unregulated
(Hampton, 1996; Shaxson, 2011).
The flip side of this logic of ring-fencing in the Euromarket was an externalization of
sovereign backstopping liability to the foreign home states of the banks operating in this
market. In practice, this disproportionately concentrated risks in US hands, both via the
Federal Reserve’s de facto role as a global lender of last resort for dollar-denominated
banking activities (in or outside of the USA), and the status of the USA as home state for
the banks conducting the largest share of Euromarket operations (Kapstein, 1991).
Ultimately, the risks created by the explosion of unregulated Euromarket deposit-taking
and lending in the 1960s and 1970s would hit home in the USA in the form of the LDC
debt and US banking crises of the early 1980s, both of which had their roots largely in
the proliferation of risky Euromarket financing structures (Strange, 1994; Curry, 1997;
2 As described by Guex (2000), Swiss banking secrecy developed as a political compromise wherein banks were
granted ironclad guarantees of client confidentiality in exchange for submitting to tightened prudential
supervision.
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Davison, 1997). In relation to the LDC sovereign debt crisis, US taxpayer assistance to
the US creditor banks of developing countries was primarily delivered indirectly, via the
US role in bailing out LDC debtor states (Curry, 1997). In the case of Continental Illinois,
however, solvency problems at one of the largest US banks stemmed from its use of risky
Euromarket wholesale financing to fund US domestic, rather than overseas lending, and
the Federal government was forced to directly rescue the bank. This incident famously led
to the coining of the term ‘too big to fail’ (Davison, 1997).
The declining effectiveness of traditional regulatory instruments, in the face of growing
Euromarket arbitrage, prompted two, somewhat contradictory regulatory responses by ‘on-
shore’ states—and in particular the USA. First, the fact the Euromarket had already under-
mined the effectiveness of ‘onshore’ regulations, even while stealing business away from
onshore banking centers such as New York, strengthened the political hand of those call-
ing for financial deregulation. Combined with the ascendance of neoliberal ideology, this
helped to drive a US-led international regulatory ‘race-to-the-bottom’—originally through
the development of limited onshore–offshore spaces, such as the New York International
Banking Facilities and Japan Offshore Market, and eventually through widespread aban-
donment or relaxation of capital controls, interest rate caps and reserve requirements
(Roberts, 1994; Shaxson, 2011.
Crucially, however, the problem of international bank home state taxpayers being forced
to underwrite the costs of bank misbehavior—even when it occurred overseas—did not go
unaddressed. The result, paradoxically, was that a far-reaching international project of
banking reregulation, coordinated via the Basel Concordats and Accords, gathered strength
simultaneously within the broader context of international banking deregulation. The most
important principle established by Basel was that of consolidated home state supervision
of international bank capitalization—or loss absorbing potential—wherein states force their
nationally headquartered banks to internalize the costs of building loss-absorbing buffers
for all of their activities, regardless of where they occur. The spread of home state capital
supervision had occurred incrementally from the mid-1970s to early 1980s, both through
national efforts, and multilaterally via the Basel Committee (see Kapstein, 1991; Herring,
2007). However, the costs imposed on US taxpayers by the LDC and Continental Illinois
bailouts prompted the USA to leverage its political clout to push for an international
strengthening and harmonization of home state capital supervision—culminating in the
1988 Basel Accord (Kapstein, 1991).
The international banking regulatory landscape that emerged in the 1980s thus differed
from the pre-1980s landscape in ways that directly undermined the traditional Euromarket.
Due to widespread onshore deregulation, the regulatory advantages of offshore
Euromarket deposit-taking were reduced. Meanwhile, regulatory arbitrage became increas-
ingly targeted at home state capital rules—particularly via the use of securitized ‘shadow
banking’ instruments to move assets off-balance sheet (or otherwise reduce capital charges;
Pozsar et al., 2012).
The negative impact that this international regulatory reconfiguration had on the
Euromarket centers (including the UK) as sites for the booking of the conventional, on-
balance sheet activities of foreign banks, is shown in Figure 1. This shows the total global
‘net offshore’ cross-border banking misalignment from 1983 to 2015 as a share of world-
wide cross-border banking activity—with ‘net offshore’ defined as cross-border bank
assets by residence, minus cross-border bank assets by nationality, summed across all
jurisdictions for which the former was larger than the latter in a particular year (with data
from BIS locational banking statistics). This is divided by the total global value of all
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cross-border bank assets in that year, providing a measure of the share of international
banking activity that has been shifted (in net) to jurisdictions that serve as booking centers
for foreign banks. As can be seen, the total net worldwide mismatch between where banks
are headquartered, and where they book their cross-border assets, dropped from nearly
half of all cross-border banking activity in the early 1980s, to less than a quarter of cross-
border banking activity by the global financial crisis. Furthermore, as illustrated in
Figure 2, there is a strongly negative relationship at the individual jurisdiction level be-
tween initial net offshore misalignment and subsequent change in net offshore misalign-
ment (over both the entire 1983–2015 period, and the three sub-periods 1983–1996,
1996–2007 and 2007–2015 also marked in Figure 13). Just as striking is the rebalancing
at the ‘onshore’ pole. Most notably, between 1983 and 2015, net offshore booked cross-
border lending by American and Japanese banks fell from 74% to 21% of the value of
cross-border lending conducted directly from the USA and Japan. This underscores the
declining advantages for banks of conducting international operations from offshore plat-
forms, as opposed to directly from their home countries.
3. Home state-level international tax and regulatory arbitrage and the
rise of European offshore national banks: 1988–2007
This relative decline in the conventional Euromarket did not imply a decline in the import-
ance of offshore banking as more broadly defined. Rather, the post-1980 regulatory
Figure 1. Aggregate ‘net offshore’ banking alignments (cross-border assets by residence minus
cross-border assets by nationality) of all BIS reporting jurisdictions with a net offshore position
(in that quarter), as a percentage of worldwide cross-border bank assets, 1983–2015.
Source: BIS locational banking statistics.
3 Q4 1983 is the first year the BIS reports bank positions by nationality. Q4 1996 and Q4 2007 are chosen as inter-
mediate dates due to their being the first year with data on Hong Kong positions by nationality, and eve of the
global financial crisis.
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reconfiguration encouraged a corresponding reconfiguration of the geographic logic of off-
shore banking, which became, in the lead-up to the global financial crisis, increasingly
shaped by the new logic of securitized shadow banking arbitrage.
First, as described in detail in Haberly and Wojcik (2017), even as offshore ‘small
islands’ declined in importance as hosts for conventional banking, they became increasing-
ly important as hosts for securitization vehicles. Most Structured Investment Vehicles
(SIVs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), for example, were issued from
Cayman Islands vehicles (Palan et al., 2010; Haberly and Wojcik, 2017). Crucially, how-
ever, as described by Haberly and Wojcik (2017) and Wainwright (2011), the domiciliation
of these vehicles in offshore ‘small islands’ was mostly motivated by tax rather than regu-
latory considerations. Principal regulatory responsibility for these vehicles was rather allo-
cated to the home states of the multinational financial firms sponsoring them—with these
vehicles being primarily designed to exploit gaps in home state consolidated capital treat-
ment rules.
In theory, the harmonization of home capital rules by the Basel Accords should have
left little scope for international capital regulatory competition on a sponsor bank
Figure 2. Initial net offshore bank assets by jurisdiction (as a percent of worldwide cross-border
bank assets) as a predictor of change in net offshore bank assets, 1983–2015. Countries labeled
by ISO code. ‘Net offshore banking’ defines as the cross-border assets of banks resident in a juris-
diction minus cross-border assets of banks headquartered in a jurisdiction (i.e. net excess of locally
booked activity by foreign banks over overseas-booked activity by national banks) as of percent
worldwide international banking assets (i.e. global banking market share).
*Jurisdiction for which data on cross-border assets by nationality is unavailable for one or both
years, but can be assumed to be negligible compared to assets by residents.
Source: BIS Location Statistics.
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nationality basis. However, the fact that Basel was a non-binding ‘soft law’ project meant
that there was in practice substantial international capital rule divergence. As described by
Thiemann (2014), this divergence was to large extent not accidental. Rather, the fact that
Basel established a new international norm of home state consolidated capital supervi-
sion—but not effective capital rule harmonization—meant that it empowered home states
to leverage relatively lax capital treatment to support the global competitiveness of their
own banks on a nationality basis. This entailed, in particular, fostering the ability of banks
to sponsor the types of ’state of the art’ securitized instruments that would ultimately gen-
erate the global financial crisis (Thiemann, 2014). The imperative to support national
banks was particularly intense in Europe due to the pressure of the ‘American invasion’,
and the competition and takeovers unleashed by the 1988 European Second Banking
Directive (Larson et al., 2011). Beyond a permissive home state regulatory attitude, this
encouraged governments to promote or at least allow, the formation of ever-larger national
banking groups through mergers and acquisitions—both as a defensive measure against
foreign takeovers, and as an aggressive measure to support bank internationalization
(Epstein and Rhodes, 2016).
The pressure on home states to support the growth, consolidation and competitiveness
of national banking sectors was widespread from the late 1980s to the global financial cri-
sis. However, this pressure was particularly intense, politically, in what can be described
as the large European ‘midshore’ financial centers.4 The UK FSA, for example, blamed its
inadequate pre-crisis supervision of British banks partly on ‘frequent political demands for
it to avoid imposing ‘unnecessary’ burdens which could undermine the competitiveness of
UK financial firms’ (p. 11) or ‘harm London’s competitiveness’ (p. 262) (FSA, 2011).
Switzerland’s FINMA describes how concerns over the expansion of too-big-to-fail Swiss
banks were overridden by the priority that regulation ‘not be allowed to jeopardise inter-
national competitiveness and Switzerland’s attractiveness as a business location’ (FINMA,
2009, 19). In the Netherlands, Engelen (2011) describes a pre-crisis regulatory and polit-
ical ‘cognitive closure’, entailing a ‘seduction of politics by the promises of lucrative fi-
nancial gains’, wherein ‘the Dutch Central Bank knowingly and willingly accommodated
the regulatory arbitrage’ of banks.’ (pp. 1790–1791). Notwithstanding the longstanding
support of European ‘midshore’ centers for financial services, this permissive, and indeed
boosterish attitude toward the rapid expansion and prudential risk-taking of national banks
represented a fundamental shift. Indeed, as recently as the 1980s, Swiss banks, for ex-
ample, were famously conservative prudentially, while the UK was actually the leading
supporter of the US push for Basel capital rule harmonization, due to the UK’s desire to
level the home regulatory playing field between British banks and their less stringently
supervised onshore competitors (Hampton, 1996, 65).
The underpinnings of post-1980s national bank expansion in large European ‘midshore’
centers are examined in more detail in the discussion below. However, its results can be
clearly seen in Figures 3–7, and Table 1—with the most striking bank growth trajectories
visible for the UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Cyprus5 and Iceland.6
Figure 3 shows the international banking market shares of the most important offshore
4 Also see Christensen et al. (2016) and Shaxson and Christensen (2013).
5 Keeping in mind that Cyprus differs from these other countries insofar as it was mostly only a banking tax and
secrecy haven, rather than regulatory haven (see Appendix A), with the failure of its banks stemming from hold-
ings of Greek sovereign debt rather than involvement in risky areas of financial innovation.
6 As discussed below, Iceland was at this time both a corporate tax haven and a banking regulatory haven.
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Figure 3. Cross-border bank assets of offshore jurisdictions by residence and nationality.
*Share of global cross-border bank assets.
**UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Switzerland.
***Caribbean, Bahrain, Hong Kong, Singapore.
****Caymans, Bermuda, Bahamas, Panama.
†Counterparty-reported assets by residents (dashed gray line).
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(including European ‘midshore’) banking centers from 1983 to 2015, on a bank residence
(host state), nationality (home state), and ‘net offshore’ (host state minus home state)
basis. As can be seen, ‘net offshore’ cross-border booking by foreign banks (solid black
lines) fell substantially (as a percent of total world international banking) in almost all off-
shore banking centers (both in and outside of Europe) between the 1980s and global finan-
cial crisis. However, the large European midshore centers simultaneously saw a rapid
growth in the international market share of nationally headquartered banks (dashed black
lines).7 This growth began abruptly in the early-mid 1990s—following the implementation
of Basel (1988–1992) and the European Second Banking Directive (1988–1993)—and
continued until the global financial crisis, with the global cross-border banking market
share of these countries’ national banks more than tripling from 11% to 36% between
1988 and 2007. Importantly, as shown in Figure 4, European offshore/midshore national
banks also grabbed market share from their ‘onshore’ European peers, with Switzerland,
the Netherlands, Ireland, and the UK in the lead. This confirms that their global market
share growth was not simply an illusion created by Europe’s increasing weight in inter-
national banking (due to EU integration and Japanese bank decline).
Figure 4. Change in total market share of cross-border European bank assets (by nationality),
1988–2007.
Source: BIS locational banking statistics.
7 This raises a causality question surrounding the accounting identity between national bank market share and net
offshore market share, as decreases in net offshore market share can be driven by either decreases in local book-
ing by foreign banks, or increases in overseas booking by national banks. Regressing quarterly change in net off-
shore booking market share on quarterly change in national bank market share (for Q4 1983–Q4 2015) indicates
that net offshore position changes are mostly driven by foreign bank booking for Switzerland (r2 ¼ 0.45),
Ireland (r2 ¼ 0.34), the UK (r2 ¼ 0.26), Luxembourg (r2 ¼ 0.19) and OECD offshore jurisdictions collectively
(r2 ¼ 0.39). However, Belgian (r2 ¼ 0.55) and Dutch (r2 ¼ 0.67) changes in net offshore position are mostly
driven by national banks.
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The pre-crisis market share growth of European ‘offshore’ or ‘midshore’ national banks
(hereafter simply ‘offshore’ national banks) was even more pronounced among the world’s
largest banks. Table 1 shows the world’s top-20 banks by assets in 1980, 1990, 2001 and
2007. In 1980, among all European offshore national banks, only two British banks made
the top-20 list. These accounted for 9% of top-20 bank assets in 1980, putting British
banks behind those from France, Japan, Germany and the USA. In 2007, however, British
banks dominated the top-20 list, accounting for more than a quarter of the list’s total
assets. Meanwhile, Swiss, Dutch, and Belgian banks increased from zero to four entries
on the list (five prior to the mid-2007 acquisition of Dutch ABN-AMRO by Belgian
Fortis and British RBS), with Britain, Switzerland, and (pre-ABN Amro takeover) the
Netherlands ranking #1, #2 and #3 for top-20 bank asset share increase from 1980 to
2007. Together, the large European offshore national banks accounted for 42.5% of top-20
bank assets in 2007. This was almost as large as the 47.3% combined share of banks from
Japan, Germany, France and the USA, which had a combined GDP 5 times larger.
The rapid market share growth of European offshore national banks was largely driven
by mergers and acquisitions (M&As)—visible in Figure 3 as discontinuous growth
through steep jumps.8 Ultimately, this reflected a sorting process wherein the headquarters
of combined banking groups gravitated toward jurisdictions with home-state-specific tax,
regulatory, and other advantages (Valkanov and Kleimeier, 2006; Focarellia and Pozzolo,
2008; DeYoung et al., 2009; Pasiouras et al., 2011).
Figure 5 provides a rough assessment of the likely importance of home-state-specific
capital regulatory, corporate taxation, and secrecy characteristics in driving the growth of
European offshore national banks between the 1980s and the global financial crisis.
Importantly, tax and regulatory advantages are defined from a strictly home state stand-
point, which for taxation means an emphasis on controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules
and tax system territoriality, and for banking regulation means exclusively examining
home state consolidated capital supervision (see Appendix A for a detailed breakdown of
characteristics used to classify countries as full or partial regulatory, tax or secrecy
Figure 5. Relationship between secrecy, regulation and tax haven status, and market share growth
of national banks (percent of worldwide cross-border assets) from Basel to the crisis (1988–2007).
Countries labeled by ISO code. See Appendix A for details of definitions and methodology.
8 Half of Switzerland’s Figure 3 increase appears to be from acquisitions of US investment banks in 1990 (First
Boston) and 2000 (Kidder Peabody, Paine Webber, Donaldson Luftkin Jeanette). Half of Ireland’s increase
comes from Depfa’s 2002 move from Germany to Dublin. The 1996–2001 spike in Dutch and Belgian growth
coincides with numerous acquisitions by ABN Amro, ING, Dexia and Fortis (see Abraham and Van Dicke
2002).
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havens). The sample of countries reporting data to the BIS on bank assets by nationality
over this period is too small (19 including counterparty-based estimates for Iceland and
Cyprus9) to permit useful multivariate disaggregation of the role of these factors in driving
offshore national bank growth.10 However, the simple bivariate plots and regressions in
Figure 5 suggest (tentatively) that European offshore national bank growth was likely
encouraged, as would be expected, by a combination of light home state corporate taxation
and permissive home state capital supervision. Meanwhile, financial secrecy does not ap-
pear to be systematically associated with national bank growth.
Interestingly, this analysis finds corporate tax haven status to be the factor most strongly
associated with pre-crisis offshore national bank growth. Notably, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and (to a lesser extent) the UK are all popular jurisdictions for corporate tax
inversions, whereby firms (particularly but not exclusively American; see Marian, 2015)
relocate their headquarters to low tax jurisdictions. Figure 4 and Appendix A suggest that
this logic of home-state-level corporate tax arbitrage likely encouraged the rapid pre-crisis
expansion of these countries’ national banks—particularly via international M&As.
Notably, the three sample countries with the lowest headline corporate tax rates—Iceland
(18% rate), Ireland (12.5%) and Cyprus (10%)—had by far the fastest rates of pre-crisis
national bank expansion (also see Appendix A). According to Engelen (2011), the Dutch
SPV formation industry that had developed to serve multinational corporate tax avoidance
also directly encouraged the expansion of Dutch banks into securitization activities that
used the same basic vehicles.
Moreover, the analysis here indicates that lax home state capital supervision likely also
encouraged European offshore national bank growth. In other words, the conventional
logic of home-state-level corporate tax inversion appears to have operated in tandem with
an additional logic of home-state-level bank regulatory inversion—keeping in mind that
this mostly played out through piecemeal international M&A accretion (see Valkanov and
Kleimeier, 2006), rather than overt bank redomiciliation (although the latter did sometimes
occur; see below). Notably, as shown in Appendix A, the major European ‘midshore’ cen-
ters do in fact appear (with a few exceptions) to have ‘won’ the race-to-the-bottom in pre-
crisis home-state capital supervision. Two key indicators of pre-crisis (2007/2008) home
capital supervision are shown in Appendix A: (i) bank ‘simple’ leverage ratios (i.e. un-
adjusted for self-assessed asset risks, and including off-balance sheet exposures),11 and (ii)
the systemic impact (in relation to shareholder equity) of crisis-implicated securities
repackaging activities on national banking systems, and absence of regulatory restrictions
on capital arbitrage via these activities (see Appendix A). Out of 19 sample countries,
eight—Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK, Germany, France, and Sweden—
were substantially worse than the others in terms of leverage, with most of their largest
banks more precariously leveraged in 2007 than the most fragile US investment bank,
Bear Stearns (which had a leverage ratio of 2.7%). Meanwhile, six countries—
Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK, Germany, and the US—were outstanding
9 For the purposes of the rough analysis here, using log-transformed asset growth, it is sufficient to know that
Icelandic and Cypriot bank growth was exceptionally high (at least several hundred percent).
10 Time series panel analysis is unlikely to help due to the infrequency of national offshore characteristic change
events, and firm-level analysis would mostly just obscure the home state sampling problem (and is an undertak-
ing beyond the scope of this article).
11 See Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012) for discussion of leverage and capital ratio manipulation. In our ana-
lysis, ‘dangerous’ pre-crisis leverage is defined based on post-crisis Basel III rules (3% leverage ratio).
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in terms of the systemic impact of securities repackaging activities on national banking
systems (and in the case of Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and Germany the lack of
restrictions on flagrant capital arbitrage via Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) con-
duits; see Thiemann, 2014). Of the five countries scoring very poorly on both indicators—
Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK, and Germany—all but Germany can be
described European ‘offshore’ jurisdictions.
Neither Ireland nor Iceland performed poorly on paper in these two core indicators—
apart from Ireland’s largest bank, Depfa, whose leverage ratio reportedly reached a stag-
geringly fragile 0.83% in 2005 (Duebel, 2013). However, they can be classified as home
capital regulatory havens based on a well-documented litany of acute regulatory lapses,
which were mostly either a part or byproduct of efforts to boost international bank com-
petitiveness (Benediktsdottir et al., 2011; Connor et al., 2012; Stewart, 2013). The most
egregious was the failure (highlighted in Appendix A) of both countries’ regulators to pre-
vent banks from manipulating their capitalizations through loan-funded purchases of their
own and each-others’ equity (directly or via related parties; Benediktsdottir et al., 2011;
Connor et al., 2012). In Iceland, as much as 70% of bank core capital was an illusory
product of this behavior, with ‘weak capital the key to rapid expansion’ (Benediktsdottir
et al., 2011). Meanwhile, the clearest demonstration of Ireland’s regulatory laxity is the
fact that its largest bank, Depfa, was in fact a bank from Germany—which as noted above
already had highly permissive home capital supervision—whose headquarters was lured to
Dublin in 2002 with the promise of even greater regulatory permissiveness and lower
taxes (Duebel, 2013; Stewart, 2013). This ‘naked’ tax and regulatory inversion doubled
the cross-border assets of ‘Irish’ national banks overnight (Figure 3).
The low scores of the large European offshore centers on home state capital regulatory
metrics, and the fact that this likely helped their national banks to expand international
market share, suggests a new twist in the debate over the responsibility of offshore juris-
dictions for the crisis (Palan et al., 2010; Shaxson, 2011; Haberly and Wójcik, 2017).
What is especially striking is the intensity of these countries’ banks’ involvement in the
riskiest securities repackaging12 activities at the heart of the financial crisis (see FCIC,
2011; Pozsar et al., 2012). As shown in Figure 6, the combined share of British, Swiss,
Dutch and Belgian financial institutions in the three most important repackaging seg-
ments—asset-backed securities (ABS) CDOs, SIVs, and credit arbitrage and hybrid ABCP
conduits—was approximately the same as financial firms from the US (37% versus 40%),
which had a GDP 3 times larger than these countries combined. Swiss banks were the se-
cond largest pre-crisis underwriters of CDOs after American banks, with a market share
larger than the next two countries combined. Moreover, the market share of offshore na-
tional banks increases as one moves toward activities in the right side of the figure—
reaching 53% for credit arbitrage and hybrid ABCP—which entail increasing direct bal-
ance sheet risk for sponsors (and their home states) due to the shorter maturities involved,
and liquidity support required (FCIC, 2011; Pozsar et al., 2012). Crucially, Figure 6 cap-
tures off-balance sheet instruments that may not be fully represented in other datasets (e.g.
from the BIS). This suggests that the overall pre-crisis market share growth of European
offshore national banks—taking into account these instruments—may have been even
more pronounced than indicated by Figures 3–4 and Table 1.
12 Off-balance sheet securitization vehicles whose assets are also securities.
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The irony of European offshore national bank involvement in shadow banking was that
the origins and conduct of these activities were, from a territorial standpoint, mostly
American. In this sense, even as European offshore national banks shifted in the 1990s
and 2000s toward specialization in home-state tax and regulatory advantages, the Wall
Street securities market partially usurped the traditional ‘offshore’ role of facilitating host-
based regulatory avoidance (see FCIC, 2011; Haberly and Wójcik, 2017). To be fair, trad-
itionally ‘offshore’ London (and its spinoff securities market in Dublin) also had a leading
position in shadow banking, from a host territorial standpoint, as one pole of the so-called
‘NY-LON’ axis. However, London was increasingly a twin of Wall Street, that specialized
in importing and adapting American financial products to Europe, rather than a place
where American banks went to do things they could not do at home (Wójcik, 2013b).
In fact, as shown in Appendix B, the large shadow banking market shares of European
offshore national banks appear to be largely explained by their aggressive acquisition of
American and British securities firms in the 1990s and early 2000s. This suggests a logic
of vertical integration (including internally within the UK) between European offshore
state home capital regulatory failure, and ‘NY-LON’ host financial innovation and govern-
ance failures. Remarkably, by 2007, Swiss banks had purchased a quarter (5/20) of what
had been the largest US investment banks in the 1980s (by M&A advising). Meanwhile,
of the eight 1982 London accepting houses (investment banks) that had come under for-
eign ownership by 2007, half were owned by Swiss, Dutch, Belgian and Icelandic banks.
Icelandic Kaupthing’s 2005 purchase of Singer and Friedlander is particularly notable, as
the latter’s London-based activities directly precipitated the former’s failure (Baldursson
and Portes, 2014). In all, European offshore national banks (including British banks)
accounted for 60% (9/15) of pre-crisis foreign ownership of what had been the leading US
and British investment/merchant banks in the 1980s.
Ultimately, where European offshore national banks were most outstanding was in the
intensity of the risks they concentrated on their home states. This is highlighted in
Figure 7. The left side shows the estimated systemic impact of securities repackaging
activities (listed in Figure 5) on national banking systems (i.e. in relation to bank assets;
Figure 6. Market shares of firms by nationality in pre-crisis underwriting and sponsorship of
securities repackaging activities.
CDO data from Beltran et al. (2013). SIV and ABCP data from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s.
*Banking groups headquartered in Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK.
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see Appendix A). By this indicator, Germany actually exhibited greater home supervisory
dereliction in relation to shadow banking than the four largest European offshore centers’
banks. However, the right side shows the value of securities repackaging activities as a
percent of bank home state GDP. By this measure, Switzerland, the UK, the Netherlands
and Belgium easily top the scale.
4. The global financial crisis and the end of the great inversion
By the eve of the global financial crisis, the old ‘offshore’ misalignment in international
banking—between the nationality of banks and the territory in which they booked their
operations—had been partially superseded by a new misalignment between the size of
European offshore national banks, and the size of their home economies, which we dub
the ‘Great Inversion’. The table in Appendix C shows the severity of this new misalign-
ment in 2007. Most extreme was the overgrowth of Iceland’s three largest banks, with
assets equal to 741% of Iceland’s GDP. Switzerland’s top three banks were only slightly
less distended, with a collective asset to GDP ratio of 687%, while the top three banks of
Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Cyprus and the UK had assets greater than 250% of
GDP.
From a purely political standpoint, this new ‘inverted’ geometry of offshore banking
misalignment was in some respects more viable than the traditional logic of Euromarket
regulatory arbitrage. Specifically, with primary responsibility for bank supervision now in
the hands of the same home state capital supervisors with de facto responsibility for back-
stopping banks, the new architecture was not beset with the unlimited moral hazard—and
consequent seeds of onshore regulatory backlash—of the pre-1980s Euromarket. Indeed,
as can be seen in Appendix C, offshore and onshore home states alike typically bore sole
responsibility (with some exceptions) for recapitalizing their own national banks.
However, this same concentration of sovereign backstopping liability in the hands of
European offshore states—whose GDP was in some cases smaller than the balance sheets
Figure 7. Total pre-crisis underwriting and sponsorship of repackaged securities by firm national-
ity by systemic impact on national banks (left) and as a % of home country GDP (right). See
Appendix A for methodological details.
*Total value ABS CDOs, SIVs and Arbitrage/Hybrid Conduits and SIVs, divided by shareholder
equity of sponsoring and underwriting institutions, multiplied by percentage of total consolidated
national bank assets accounted for sponsoring and underwriting institutions.






/joeg/article/20/6/1263/6017416 by guest on 12 January 2021
of individual national banks—raised the prospect that banks might not only be ‘too big to
fail’, but also ‘too big to save’ from the standpoint of these states.
Importantly, the extent to which banks are ‘overextended’, in relation to home state
backstopping capacity is not simply determined by bank size in relation to GDP, but also
the currency denomination of bank liabilities. Table 2 probes the impact of this through re-
gression modeling of post-global financial crisis (Q4 2007–Q4 2012) change in the cross-
border assets of banks by nationality. The first independent variable is simply total cross-
border liabilities of national banks in Q4 2007 as a percent of home country GDP.
Meanwhile, the other variables test the impact of bank liability currency denomination.
Central banks have a theoretically unlimited capacity to backstop the own-currency liabil-
ities of both banks and the sovereigns supporting these banks. Consequently, foreign
currency-denominated bank liabilities should be more harmful to crisis resilience than
own-currency liabilities (Buiter and Sibert, 2011). In practice, however, this is complicated
by additional factors. During the crisis, foreign currency funding pressures were alleviated
by inter-central bank swap lines, and central bank liquidity support to foreign bank offices
within their jurisdiction. The Federal Reserve was particularly generous in backstopping
the dollar liquidity of foreigners (McDowell, 2011; Helleiner, 2014). Furthermore, states
can ‘self-insure’ against foreign currency funding problems by accumulating sovereign




Split sample: independent countries only
local forex
liability data
Sample size 39 39 33 33 33 33 19 19
Variables (values for Q4 ’07) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
All X-border Liabilities/GDP 0.040 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.15
Net X-border Foreign
Currency Liabilitiesa/GDP









and local) and all Euro
Liabb/GDP
0.042**
Adj. r2 0.004 0.32 0.30 0.42 0.40 0.61 0.75 0.76
All models use Ordinary Least Squares regression, where dependent variable is log (2012 x-border bank assets
by nationality/2007 x-border bank assets by nationality).
All independent variables only include cross-border liabilities.
aIncludes Eurozone member Euro-denominated cross-border liabilities (reported or estimated).
bIncludes all (estimated) Euro-denominated liabilities, cross-border and local, of both Eurozone and non-Eurozone
member banks.
**Significant at 5% level.
***Significant at 1% level.
Source: BIS locational banking statistics; World Bank WDI; ECB (details in online supplemental datatable 3).
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wealth funds and foreign exchange reserves (Aizenman and Lee, 2007). Finally, the
European Central Bank (ECB) is banned from acting as a sovereign lender of last resort
to Eurozone states, meaning that their banks’ own-currency liabilities are more akin to for-
eign currency liabilities once a crisis moves them onto the state’s actual or assumed de
facto balance sheet (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). Complicating matters has been the
Eurozone’s ad hoc development of sovereign lender-of-last-resort-like workarounds (Buiter
and Rahbari, 2012).
The impact of bank liability currency denomination is probed through two variables.
The first is 2007 ‘foreign currency exposure’—i.e. the cross-border foreign currency-
denominated liabilities of all national banks, minus sovereign foreign exchange reserves,
as a percent of home country GDP. The Euro-denominated liabilities of all countries’
banks, including Eurozone members, are treated as foreign currency for this variable.
However, Euro-denominated liabilities of Eurozone member banks are also included as a
second variable, allowing for the disaggregation of their impact from that of ‘true’ foreign
currency liabilities. Finally, politically-dependent jurisdictions are disaggregated from inde-
pendent countries (via dummy and interaction terms in Model 2, and sample division in
Models 3–6) to account for the formal or tacit fiscal backstops the former enjoy from co-
lonial patrons (e.g. the 2009 UK bailout of the Caymans Islands).
Due to the limited sample of BIS-reporting countries, only a small number of variables
can be tested simultaneously. Furthermore, the results should be treated with some caution
due the necessity of estimating foreign currency liabilities by nationality from foreign cur-
rency liabilities by residence for a number of jurisdictions (fully for 14, and partially for
4, of 39). However, they are nevertheless intriguing. First, the simple cross-border
Table 3. Nationality of Top 20 World Banks by Assets, 2007–2019
2007 2012 2019 2007–2019
# Asset % # Asset % # Asset % Asset % Chg.
UK 4 26.6 China 4 21.1 China 4 35.3 China 32.2
France 3 16.9 France 4 19.3 USA 4 19.1 Japan 6.0
US 3 14.6 UK 3 16.5 France 4 16.2 USA 4.5
Switz. 2 8.6 USA 3 14.9 Japan 3 13.6 Spain 0.1
Germ. 1 7.9 Japan 3 14.6 UK 2 8.7 France 0.7
Japan 2 7.6 Germ. 1 6.1 Spain 1 3.6 Belg. 3.0
Italy 1 4.0 Spain 1 3.9 Germ. 1 3.4 Italy 4.0
Neth. 1 3.9 (7.9)a Neth. 1 3.6 Germ. 4.6
Spain 1 3.6 Neth. 3.9 (7.9)a
China 1 3.2 Switz. 8.6


















aFigure in parentheses estimated value for Dutch national bank groups before RBS (UK), Fortis (BE) and
Santander (ES) purchase of ABN Amro (NL) in late 2007.
Source: Global Finance.
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liabilities/GDP variable strongly predicts post-crisis international bank retrenchment, but
only for independent countries rather than dependent jurisdictions (evidenced by the varia-
ble’s significance in Models 2 and 3 but not 1; also see Figure 4). This highlights the ex-
tent to which politically dependent offshore jurisdictions free-ride on the explicit or
implicit backing of ‘big brother’ (Hampton, 1996)—keeping in mind that none of these
dependent jurisdictions (e.g. UK territories) was important sites for pre-crisis national
bank growth. The second key finding is that foreign currency (including Eurozone-
member Euro) liabilities are not simply more harmful to national bank resilience than
own-currency-denominated liabilities, but that the latter are not harmful at all (Model 4).
This underscores the shock-absorbing ‘money printing’ capacity of central banks in rela-
tion to national own-currency denominated liabilities. Given that central bank liquidity
support to banks was quite cosmopolitan, it also appears to highlight the importance for
banking stability of the more narrowly nationalistic logic of central banks’ sovereign lend-
er of last resort support.
Finally, the results show that the Eurozone was exceptionally toxic to large banking
groups headquartered in small economies. As can be seen in Model 6 (which explains
61% of post-crisis bank asset change), the Euro-denominated cross-border liabilities of
Eurozone member banks were actually worse than foreign currency denominated liabilities
in terms of their impact on post-crisis bank stability. One possible explanation is that un-
like other countries’ banks, all of the domestic liabilities of Eurozone banks are also ef-
fectively foreign currency liabilities for which there is no sovereign lender of last resort.
However, Model 8, which adjusts foreign currency exposure to include all cross-border
and (estimated) local liabilities of Eurozone member banks, and the local foreign currency
liabilities of non-Eurozone member banks (for countries with available data), indicates that
this only partially explains the Eurozone’s toxicity to bank stability. This suggests that the
Eurozone’s ad hoc sovereign lender of last resort workarounds were not only effectively
useless (corroborating De Grauwe and Ji, 2013), but actually may have amplified the fall-
out of the crisis via self-defeating austerity programs, and investor uncertainty generated
by international political wrangling. This provides important contextualization for the se-
verity of the bank-driven sovereign debt crises in Ireland and Cyprus.
Notably, whether the process of European offshore national bank retrenchment trans-
lated into relatively severe as opposed to mild national fiscal pain appears to have been
conditioned by substantial country-level contingency. This can be seen in Figure 8, which
plots the relationship (Model 5 in Table 2) between 2007 ‘foreign currency exposure’ and
2007–2012 change in cross-border bank assets, illustrating the post-crisis rebalancing of
the misalignment between international bank size and home state backstopping capacity.
What is particularly interesting is that the Eurozone offshore jurisdictions (with available
data)—Ireland and the Benelux countries13—are clustered closely together in the lower
right corner of the figure, indicating extreme pre-crisis currency exposure, and correspond-
ingly pronounced post-crisis retrenchment. Crucially, both Ireland and the Benelux
Countries had their most problematic international banks—Irish Depfa, Dutch ABN Amro
and Belgian Fortis—fortuitously come under foreign ownership immediately prior to or in
the early stages of their failure (see Appendix C). Belgium—the pre-crisis assets of whose
top three banks, all of which failed, were 534% of GDP (compared to 305% for
Ireland)—was particularly fortunate, as France helped rescue both Fortis, via its
13 Cyprus is omitted due to a lack of data on bank asset change by nationality.
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acquisition by BNP Paribas, and Dexia, via a highly unusual transnational capital injection
(reflecting Dexia’s dual nationality). With the most troubled international banks of all of
these states fully or partially removed from their contingent sovereign balance sheets,
Ireland seems to have been left in relatively worse shape due to the Irish real estate crash’s
impact on its remaining, more domestically-oriented banks.
The peculiar crisis experience of Eurozone offshore national banks—both in terms of
the ECB’s exceptional failure as a sovereign lender of last resort, and the 11th hour music-
al chairs of bank nationality shifts—raises questions about what could have been, either
for better or worse, for Eurozone offshore centers with large national banks. Ultimately,
however, as shown in Table 3 (and Figure 3), the days when some of the world’s largest
banks were based in economies far smaller than these banks have now come to an end.
No country whose banks appeared on the 2019 top 20 list of world banks by assets
(Table 3) had a GDP smaller than $1 trillion, and only one, Spain, had a GDP smaller
than $2 trillion. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 9, post-crisis offshore bank retrenchment
is even more pronounced when cross-border assets are viewed in relation to world GDP,
as this retrenchment has been amplified, in absolute terms, by a decline in worldwide
cross-border bank assets as a percent of world GDP.
5. Conclusion: the political geographic paradox of offshore banking
In this article, we have presented a novel analysis of the evolution of offshore banking
from the 1980s to global financial crisis. We have shown that the traditional model of off-
shore Euromarket banking was subjected to a structural squeeze for three decades prior to
the global financial crisis. Specifically, the combination of widespread international de-
regulation in traditional territorialized areas of banking regulation, and the construction of
Figure 8. Net cross-border foreign currency exposure of national banks in Q4 2007, and change
in cross-border assets of national banks from Q4 2007 to Q4 2012. Countries labeled by ISO
code.
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a new home-state centered capital regulatory regime under Basel, reduced the advantages
for ‘onshore’ banks of booking conventional deposit-taking and lending offshore.
Meanwhile, the logic of this new regulatory configuration encouraged the rise of shadow
banking regulatory arbitrage that exploited gaps in home state consolidated capital rules.
Between the 1980s and the global financial crisis, this change in the logic of banking
regulatory arbitrage prompted a geographic and functional reorganization of the global off-
shore banking system. This entailed ‘small island’ jurisdictions increasingly becoming
platforms for securitization vehicles, while large European ‘midshore’ jurisdictions increas-
ingly specialized in providing home-state-specific tax and capital regulatory advantages to
their own national banks as sponsors for these activities—thus encouraging a substantial
percentage of the international banking system to be shifted, through mergers and acquisi-
tions, to the ownership of these banks. The result of this ‘Great Inversion’ was the emer-
gence, by the global financial crisis, of an unsustainable new offshore banking
misalignment between the size of these overgrown European offshore national banks, and
the backstopping capacity of their home states. Following the shock of the crisis, this edi-
fice came crashing down.
Notably, the lessons of this experience appear to have, at least temporarily, been learn-
ed. A key consideration in HSBC’s recent decision not to move to lightly taxed Hong
Kong seems to have been the fear that its dollar liabilities were too big for Hong Kong to
backstop even with its foreign reserves (The Economist, 2016). Meanwhile, the
Netherlands has rebuffed Swedish Nordea’s interest in inverting to Dutch nationality, to
lower its capital regulatory and tax burden, by merging with ABN Amro. As one analyst
put it:
[the Dutch government] would never allow ABN Amro to merge with a foreign bank looking to
flee its own regulatory regime. . .The Netherlands has barely recovered from ABN Amro’s last
adventure with banks from abroad. (De Jong, 2016)
Ultimately, our findings suggest that states such as Ireland, Iceland and Cyprus were
merely the most visible causalities of a political–geographic paradox that makes offshore
Figure 9. Cross-border bank assets of major offshore jurisdictions as a percent of world GDP,
1983–2015.
*As a share of world GDP.
**UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Switzerland.
***Caribbean, Bahrain, Hong Kong, Singapore.
†Counterparty-reported assets by resident.
Source: BIS locational banking statistics.
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banking center development largely unsustainable, over the long-run, under either a host
or a home-based international banking regulatory regime. On the one hand, when inter-
national banking regulation is dominated by host states, ‘offshore’ hosts have substantial
regulatory leverage to attract the operations of foreign banks backstopped by foreign gov-
ernments. However, the moral hazard entailed by the fact that onshore states are forced to
absorb the costs of offshore bad behavior, means that such a host-state-dominated pattern
of banking regulation is politically precarious, over the long-run—as it is likely to gener-
ate an onshore regulatory backlash that undermines the scope for offshore hosts to attract
business. Conversely, an ‘inverted’ paradigm of offshore national bank development fos-
tered by home-state-dominated regulation is more politically stable from an international
standpoint, as offshore states are mostly forced to internalize the costs of the regulatory
laxity they employ to support national bank competitiveness. However, this same offshore
internalization of bank backstopping costs, within states with a limited capacity to under-
write these costs, makes such an arrangement structurally unstable in the event of a finan-
cial crisis.
Notably, however, offshore centers do not appear to be wholly without options for navi-
gating this paradox. Most strikingly, a new pattern of ‘offshore state capitalism’ appears to
be developing in Asia as a sort of dialectical synthesis that resolves both prongs of the
paradox—with Singapore and Hong Kong showing the only substantial post-crisis banking
market share growth among offshore banking centers in Figure 3. On the one hand, these
jurisdictions self-insure against financial shocks through foreign exchange reserve and sov-
ereign wealth fund accumulation (Aizenman and Lee, 2007; Clark and Monk, 2010). On
the other hand, the onshore–offshore political relationship is stabilized by direct Chinese
state patronage, with the latter’s state-owned banks playing the leading role in fostering
the development of the offshore RMB market (Walter and Howie, 2011; Hall, 2018).
Ultimately—as observed by Polanyi for economic liberalization generally—the fate of the
offshore ‘liberation’ of markets from the reach of the state appears to be, paradoxically, to
drive an expanding role of the state in supporting and operating these markets.
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’07 CIT < 20%: 2007 Corporate Income tax rate below 20%. Source: KPMG (2017).
No CFC þ Territorial: Territorial corporate taxation system combined with lack of controlled foreign corporation
rules (gives national firms total or near-total exemption of from home state taxation of foreign-source profits,
including profits that are aggressively sheltered from host state taxation; see EC, 2015). Source: EC (2015) and
Deloitte Taxation and Investment Guides and Country Highlights.
’09 FDI > GDP: Total outward foreign direct investment larger than gross domestic product in 2009 (first year
with available IMF CDIS data).
US Inversions (’82–’07): Number of US firms moving headquarters to jurisdictions via inversions through 2007.
Source: Bloomberg (2017).
’09 FSI > 70%: Opacity score of greater than 70% in 2009 Tax Justice Network Financial Secrecy Index (first
available year).
Savings Dir. Opt Out: Jurisdictions complying with Savings Directive by levying withholding tax rather than
sharing taxpayer information.
Leverage ratio < 3%: Largest and or second largest bank in country by 2007 assets had a leverage ratio smaller
than 3% (i.e. would have been noncompliant with post-crisis Basel III leverage standard). Approximate ranges
are given based on authors’ calculations from Bankscope and a number of secondary sources, to reflect fluctu-
ation over time and variation stemming from source and methodological details.
All Banks Lev. Ratio <4%: Total leverage ratio of banking system <4 % in 2008 (earliest date of data availabil-
ity from ECB). EU member only. Source: ECB Consolidated Banking Data.
CDOs, ABCP and SIVs > 25% bank equity (’07): Total value of ABSs Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs),
credit arbitrage and hybrid ABCP conduits and SIVs >25% of the shareholder equity of national banks involved
in sponsoring/underwriting these vehicles. Captures the potential risk posed by all major forms of pre-crisis secur-
ities repackaging for the banks involved in these activities. CDO data from Beltran et al. (2013). SIV and ABCP
data from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. Shareholder equity data from Bankscope and company reports.
CDOs, ABCP and SIVs systemic impact (’07): Multiplies percentage in previous row by percentage of total con-
solidated national banking system assets (estimated from ECB and BIS data) accounted for by banks directly
involved in securities repackaging. Gauges potential systemic risk of securities repackaging activities to the na-
tional banking system as a whole rather than only to banks directly involved in repackaging.
No ABCP capital charge: Jurisdictions did not apply any capital charge to bank liquidity support lines to ABCP
conduits prior to 2007/2008 Basel II phase-in (effectively allowed unlimited movement of assets into off-balance
sheet vehicles). From Thiemann (2014).
Banks fund own equity: Pre-crisis bank capitalizations artificially inflated (and apparent leverage depressed)
through equity purchases funded by loans from banks themselves (or among each other).
Offshore dependencies: Number of overseas dependencies/territories of country ranked on 2009 Tax Justice
Network Financial Secrecy Index.
Net offshore intl. banking position, 1988: Q4 1988 Cross-border bank assets by residence exceeded cross-border
assets by nationality.
National Bank Market Share Growth ’88–’07: Q4 2007 cross-border asset share by bank nationality divided by
Q4 1988 share.
ND: No data.
aUK has been a major corporate tax haven since 2010 Tory tax changes (e.g. 10 US corporate inversions 2010–
2017). Difficult to classify pre-2010; central hub of global tax haven network (current and former dependencies),
and widely used as offshore FDI conduit.
bMinor role as FDI conduit jurisdiction.
cThe Netherlands has CFC rules, but these are largely overridden in practice by participation exemption.
dIreland operates worldwide taxation system but has no CFC rules.
eAustria has no CFC rules, but has alternate rules serving similar purpose.
fUS secrecy haven status at state level (mostly Delaware; also Wyoming, Nevada).
g‘Regulatory haven’ here refers specifically to consolidated home-state capital supervision of nationally headquar-
tered bank groups.
hSee in-text discussion or Ireland and Iceland.
iUS supervision of investment banks by Securities and Exchange Commission under Consolidated Supervised
Entity (CSE) program was much weaker than supervision of commercial banks by Federal Reserve (see FCIC,
2011).
jNational bank growth figures for Iceland and Cyprus are estimates based on counterparty-reported assets by
residence.
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Appendix B. Ownership in 2007 of largest 1980s US and British investment and merchant banks
Parent company, 2007 Top 20 US Investment Banks by M&A
Advising, 1980–1991 (with acquisition
date)
London Accepting Houses, 1982
(with acquisition date)
Total
Swiss UBS Kidder Peabody (2000), PaineWebber
(2000) Dillon Read (1997)
S. G. Warburg (1995) 6
Credit Suisse First Boston (1990), Donaldson Lufkin
and Jenrette (2000)
US Citigroup Shearson Lehman Hutton (1998),
Salomon Brothers (1998), Smith
Barney Harris Upham (1998)
4
JP Morgan Robert Fleming (2000)
German Deutsche Bank Alex Brown and Son (1999), Bankers
Trust (1999)
Morgan Grenfell (1990) 4
Dresdner Bank Kleinwort Benson (1995)
British HSBC Samuel Montagu (1974)
Charterhouse Japhet (2000)
4
Lloyds TSB Hill Samuel (1987)
Investec Guiness Mahon (1998)
Dutch ABN Amro Baring Brothers (US) (2001) 1
ING Baring Brothers (1995)
Icelandic Kaupthing Singer and Friedlander (2005) 1
Belgian KBC Brown Shipley (1992) 1
French Société Générale Hambros (1998) 1
Independent in 2007 Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley (incl.
Dean Witter Reynolds), Merrill
Lynch, Keefe Bruyette and Woods,
Lazard, Shearson Lehman Brother,
Bear Stearns, Financo




Defunct Drexel Burnham Lambert 1
Total 20 16 36
US Investment Bank M&A data from Rau (2000). London Accepting House list from Hablutzel (1992).
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